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Abstract
This paper examines Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Both documents affirm freedom of
religion as a fundamental human right, yet both recognize the need for restrictions on freedom of
religion when “necessary.” The paper discusses the text of Articles 18 and 9, as well as European
Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Committee cases interpreting and applying the Articles.
The paper then analyzes several current laws restricting religious freedom on necessity grounds as to
whether the restrictions are legitimate or illegitimate under the instruments. I conclude that the laws
from several States likely do not pass muster, and pose a great risk to religious freedom.
My second primary contention is that the “principle of secularism” (as defined primarily in
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence), without more, is an illegitimate justification for
restrictions on religious freedom under the ICCPR and the ECHR. More specifically, the principle of
secularism functioning as a principle by which religious expression may be excluded from full
participation in democratic government is inimical to the ICCPR’s and ECHR’s vision of religious
pluralism as “indissociable” from a democratic society. Further, the European Court’s application of
the principle improperly equates a “secular” government with a democratic government, and as such
is in tension with prior cases in which the Court has affirmed religious pluralism as axiomatic for a
democratic society. The paper concludes with a discussion of the case of a pastor in Sweden who was
convicted for preaching a sermon condemning homosexuality, as a test case for the application of the
principles discussed throughout.

The Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis ofthe Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR
and the ECHR
M. Todd Parker
I.

Introduction
Freedom of religion, though forming part of the “core” of most conceptions of human

rights, continues to remain a “particularly controversial right.”1 While religious liberty is now
viewed by the international community as a “privilege that is so foundational and precious that it
should be guaranteed by international law,” its scope and function remains open to significant
debate and disagreement.2 Some attribute this tension in part to religious claims to possession of
absolute truth, which may result in lack of respect for the freedom of members ofother faiths .3 In
addition, some religious authorities reject religious freedom as an abdication of a divine mandate
to practice and promote one’s faith publicly, and view conversion to other religions as
punishable heresy.4
In addition to these specifically religious reasons for narrowing the scope of freedom of
religion, governments in many regions of the world actively deny religious freedom. This denial
ranges from the genocide of religious minorities5 to rigid restrictions on churches’ governance
and practice.6 The denial can take an even more passive form, as seen in a fairly recent case
before the European Court of Human Rights in which the Court held that the refusal of
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Moldovan authorities to officially recognize the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (after
repeated applications for recognition) violated the church members’ freedom of religion.7
The most severe restrictions on religious freedom leave no doubt as to their violation of
international human rights provisions such as Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). However, because these documents allow governments to limit religious freedom under
certain circumstances, less egregious impingements involve close questions as to whether they
are justifiable restrictions under the “necessity” provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR.
This paper will examine whether the restrictions on religious freedom found in a number
of current legislative statutes around the world—and defended on any of a number of the
“necessity” grounds—are justifiable under the necessity clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR.8
As explained in more detail below, the focus of the paper will be on the manifestation of
religious belief, rather than on the freedom to believe privately whatever one wishes (recognized
by both instruments as a right that may never be limited by government). Part II will describe
the relevant textual provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, along with commentary interpreting
those texts, and will describe general principles of law developed by the Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in deciding cases under the two
instruments. Part III will describe and examine pertinent decisions of the Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in their development of principles for
evaluating whether legislation restricting religious freedom is justifiable under the necessity
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clauses. Part IV will evaluate several current laws and argue that certain recurring language in
the laws is problematic under the ICCPR and the ECHR. Part V will describe and critique the
“principle of secularism” as a distinct justification for restricting religious freedom. This Part
will argue that the principle of secularism as it is being defined and applied, particularly in
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, is not a sufficient justification for restrictions on
religious freedom. Finally, Part VI will consider the case of a Swedish pastor who was convicted
for preaching against homosexuality as a test case for application of the laws discussed in Part IV
and the principle of secularism discussed in Part V. This part will contend that the Swedish
pastor should not be prosecuted under the ECHR and the ICCPR necessity clauses, but that the
language of the laws discussed in Part III could easily be read to proscribe the sermon the pastor
preached and the principle of secularism as currently defined and applied could also be read to
do the same.
II.

The ICCPR and the ECHR
A.

The Right

Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR both declare that everyone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.9 Both also declare that this freedom is
individual and collective, embracing the private, inner-life of religious belief (the forum
internum10) as well as the public manifestation of religious belief, individually or in community,
in the form of worship, observance, practice and teaching.11 The forum internum is inviolable in
both documents and subject to none of the possible limitations to which the manifestation of
9
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religion is. Manfred Nowak calls freedom of religion and belief in the private realm “passive”
freedom in that states are prohibited from dictating or forbidding confession to or membership in
a religion or belief.”12 The other part of this private realm not subjected to restriction under the
ICCPR is practice that does not touch upon the freedom and sphere of privacy of others, but
instead “primarily relates to the practice of religious rituals and customs in the home, either alone
or in community with others.”13
The freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching is the more public freedom of religion that is subject to limitation under both Article 18
and Article 9. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the freedom to manifest one’s
religion protects acts which are “intimately linked” to religious belief, such as acts of worship or
devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised
form.”14 The term “practice” does not, according to the Court, “cover any act which is motivated
or influenced by a religion or belief” and one does not necessarily have the right “to behave in
the public sphere in a manner dictated by a religion or a conviction.”15 According to Nowak,
worship under the ICCPR means the typical form of religious prayer and preaching, i.e., freedom
of ritual; observance covers processions, wearing of religious clothing, prayer and all other
customs and rites of the various religions; and teaching is understood as every form of imparting
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the substance of a religion or belief.16 In the General Comments to the ICCPR, “practice” seems
to overlap with both observance and teaching, and includes the freedom to choose religious
leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools, and the
freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.17 Nowak, in recognition of the
need for “practice” not to include every action or omission motivated by religion or belief, says
“Religious practice may thus be said to be only that conduct obviously related to a religious
conviction.”18
B.

The Restrictions

Because the publicmanifestation of religion has the potential to interfere with the rights
of others or to pose a danger to society, it is not absolute. Article 18 subjects manifestation of
religion or belief to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.19 Using slightly
different language, Article 9 subjects manifestation of religion or belief to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.20 The General Comment to Article 18 says that these limitations are to be strictly
interpreted such that restrictions that are not listed in the Article are not allowed.21 Further,
limitations must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are
predicated, and may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory
manner.22 One author points out that almost all of the ICCPR limitation clauses use the word
16
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“necessary,” indicating that restrictions on rights “are permissible only when they are essential,
i.e., inevitable.”23 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has taken care to construe
narrowly the “prescribed by law” requirement in order to circumvent hiding religious freedom
violations behind domestic law. In Kalac v. Turkey, the Court said the requirement is designed to
ensure “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public
authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 2.’”24
C.

Pluralism as Axiomatic

Both the ECHR and the HRC have indicated that respect for the principle of pluralism is
fundamental when considering the justifiability of a restriction on religious freedom. The ECHR
has indicated that government restrictions on religious freedom may be necessary at times in
order to “reconcile the interests of differing groups and to ensure respect for the convictions of
all.”25 However, the court has also recognized that the State must remain “neutral and impartial”
with an aim to the “maintenance of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy” rather
than with an aim to “remove the cause of the tensions by doing away with pluralism.”26 In the
context of freedom of association, the restriction of which requires justifications similar to
Article 9, the Court has said, “The autonomy of religious communities is in fact indispensable to
pluralism in a democratic society.”27
In Kokkinakis v. Greece and Manoussakis v. Greece, the Court even more explicitly
affirmed religious pluralism as fundamental to the question of whether a law restricting religious
freedom could be “necessary in a democratic society.” Manoussakis recognized a “margin of
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appreciation” for contracting states to restrict religious liberty, but noted that “In delimiting the
extent of the margin of appreciation...the Court must have regard to what is at stake, namely the
need to secure true religious pluralism, an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic
society.”28 In Kokkinakis, the Court said that freedom of religion “is one of the foundations of a
`democratic society’” and “The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society which has
been dearly won over the centuries depends on it.”29 General Comment 22 to Article 18 of the
ICCPR does not use the term pluralism, but requires that States parties proceed with an attitude
of “equality and non-discrimination” towards all religions.30 Further, in a dissenting opinion in
Paul Westerman v. the Netherlands, a Human Rights Committee member argued that
“conscientious objection is based on a pluralistic conception of society in which acceptance
rather than coercion is the decisive factor.31
Professor W. Cole Durham has called the principle of pluralism a “fundamental axiom of
international human rights.”32 Professor Michael McConnell, in analyzing U.S. religious liberty
jurisprudence, has advocated an “animating principle of pluralism and diversity” over against the
“maintenance of a scrupulous secularism in all aspects of public life touched by government”
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that in his view has too often typified U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence.33 He
goes on to say, “My position is that the Religion Clauses do not create a secular public
sphere...[r]ather, the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to protect the religious lives of people
from unnecessary intrusions of government, whether promoting or hindering religion. It is to
foster a regime of religious pluralism, as distinguished from both majoritarianism and
secularism.”34 According to McConnell, his religious pluralism view of the religion clauses in
the U.S. Constitution contrasts with the Warren and Burger Courts’ “mission to protect
democratic society from religion.”35 While this view is in specific reference to U.S. religious
liberty, it echoes the ECHR’s view of an “indissociable” union between democratic society and
religious pluralism.36
One point of clarity may be necessary on the point of religious pluralism as an axiomatic
principle. The commentators mentioned above are careful to note that protecting a robust
pluralism does not require relativism of belief. Durham specifically argues that states “should
insist on tolerance and mutual respect among citizens, but may not insist that believers
compromise or relativize their commitment to the truths in which they believe.”37 He warns
against the view that would equate exclusivist truth claims with “extremism,” and notes that a
religious community “can claim that its beliefs are true without believing that its beliefs may be
33

Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.Chi. L. Rev. 115, 116 (1992).
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imposed on others.”38 McConnell similarly eschews the idea thatprotecting pluralism means
requiring religious claims to be “tamed, cheapened, and secularized” in order to find a place
alongside the beliefs of fellow citizens in public life. Applying these principles to the ECHR and
HRC, one must not mistake the ECHR’s recognition of the government’s role in ensuring
“mutual tolerance” as a requirement that religions relativize the fundamental tenets of their
religion. Indeed, in the context of freedom of expression, the Court has said that protection
extends not only to popular views “but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”39
Accepting religious pluralism in principle does not answer the more specific question of
whether and to what extent government may legitimately constrain religious freedom as an
exercise of necessity in particular cases. However, accepting religious pluralism in principle does
further the analysis to the extent that it limits the ability of governments to restrict religious
freedom on the ground that public manifestation of religious ideas or practice somehow
constitute a per se threat to democratic government. To the extent that pluralism of religious
views and practice as a prescriptive norm is “indissociable” from democracy itself, a government
that purports to legitimately restrict manifestations of religious belief from finding full
expression in society--ostensibly because such a restriction is “necessary” to protect that society-bears the burden of showing that a true, identifiable necessity exists to justify the restriction.
Specifically, a government must identify how curbing religious freedom in a particular instance
will not violate the axiomatic principle of religious pluralism, and by extension democracy itself.
Such a view does not preclude appropriately specific justifications for curbing religious freedom,
but guards against an inversion of the principle that would view robust expression of religious
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ideas and practice as somehow inimical to a democratic society, and thus subject to restriction
simply by virtue of its religious nature.
D.

Margin of Appreciation and Level of Scrutiny

Finally, the ECHR and the HRC have had to determine how they should apply these
principles to particular cases. In order to “balance general societal interests against the interests
of the individual or group adversely affected by the state’s action” the ECHR has begun to
develop standards of review such as its “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Under the doctrine,
national governments are given some discretion as to the manner in which they implement
European Convention rights.40 When a state’s law falls within a “predictably amorphous range of
acceptable alternatives” the Court is likely to uphold the state’s law as within the margin of
appreciation.41 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has indicated its willingness to look at
“context” in assessing alleged violations of the ICCPR. In Raihon Hudoyberganova v.
Uzbekistan, the Committee concluded that there had been a violation of Article 18 of the ICCPR,
and noted that it had reached its decision “duly taking into account the specifics of the
context.”42
While the margin of appreciation recognizes the freedom of European states to exercise
some measure of sovereignty, the level of discretion given to the national government depends to
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a large degree on the content of the right at issue.43 The more fundamental the right, the more
specifically the limitation on the right must be tailored to the aim sought and the more the means
chosen must be proportional to the “legitimate” end.44 The scrutiny encouraged by the ICCPR is
similar in its requirement that a restriction on religious liberty be “proportional in severity and
intensity to the purpose being sought.”45 Importantly for purposes of this paper, the ECHR has
specified that restrictions on religious freedom “call for very strict scrutiny by the Court.”46
Thus, while the Court will consider the margin of appreciation and take restrictions on religious
freedom on a case-by- case basis because of the inherently fact-sensitive balancing between the
right and the government necessity, the government bears the heavy burden of showing that a
limitation is actually “necessary” and that it is narrowly tailored to the necessity at issue.
III.

Judicial Application: Specific Cases47
Before moving to an assessment of current laws in light of the above-mentioned general

principles, the paper now proceeds to a brief examination of specific ECHR cases that have
considered when and if a restriction of religious freedom meets the necessity requirements. In
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the Court found that the government’s refusal to
recognize the Church of Bessarabia was an interference with its freedom of religion.48 The Court
said that the government was pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting against the revival of long-
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standing rivalries between Russia and Romania which could endanger the social peace and
territorial integrity of Moldova.49 However, refusal to recognize the applicant church was not a
legitimate means to fulfill this aim because the government was not acting neutrally and
impartially, its concerns about national security and territorial integrity were “purely
hypothetical,” and the significant consequences for religious freedom were not proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued.50 Thus, the Court upheld the ICCPR and ECHR requirement that a
restriction be proportionate to its goal.
In Manoussakis v. Greece, the Court found a violation of Article 9 when Jehovah’s
Witnesses were prosecuted for establishing and operating a place of worship without first
obtaining the authorization required by law.51 The government argued that the authorization
measures, which included the Greek Orthodox Church in the approval process and criminalized
the use of a non-authorized place of worship, served to protect public order and the rights, and
given freedoms of others in the context of the important history of the Greek Orthodox Church in
Greece and the fact that sects seek to manifest their ideas and doctrines using all sorts of
“unlawful and dishonest” means and are “socially dangerous.”52 The Court said that “States are
entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious
aims, activities which are harmful to the population,” and held that the protection of public order
was a legitimate aim under the circumstances.53 However, the Court held that Article 9 had been
violated because the law had been used to “impose rigid, or indeed prohibitive, conditions on
practice of religious beliefs by certain non-orthodox movements” and “to restrict the activities of
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faiths outside the Orthodox church.”54 The Court concluded by saying that the convictions had
such a direct effect on freedom of religion that they “cannot be regarded as proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, nor, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society.”55 The case
illustrates the limits of the margin of appreciation doctrine when the impact on religious freedom
is direct and not narrowly tailored to a legitimate aim.
In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who
was convicted of improper proselytism after he and his wife engaged in a religious discussion
with a woman in her home.56 The government argued that it had to “protect a person’s religious
beliefs and dignity from attempts to influence them by immoral and deceitful means.”57 The
Court made a distinction between bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism, with the
former involving “true evangelism” and the latter involving improper pressure and possibly even
the use of violence and brainwashing.58 The Court said that the Greek law was proper insofar as
it was designed to punish only the latter, but that Greece had not sufficiently specified the way in
which the applicant had attempted to convince his neighbor by “improper means.”59 The Court
thus concluded that the applicant’s conviction was not justified by a pressing social need and that
the law was “not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or...for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.”60
In Valsamis v. Greece, a Jehovah’s Witness student in the State secondary education
school refused to take part in the celebration of the National Day school parade commemorating
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the outbreak of war between Greece and Italy in 1940.61 Her parents contended that pacificism is
a fundamental tent of their religion and forbids even indirect conduct or practice associated with
war. 62 The school had previously exempted her from attendance at religious education lessons
and Orthodox Mass, but suspended her from school for one day for failure to attend the parade.63
The applicant argued that Article 9 guaranteed her right to the “negative freedom not to manifest,
by gestures of support, any convictions or opinions contrary to her own” and that the punishment
“stigmatized and marginalized” her.64 The Court rejected the argument and adopted the
Commission’s view that Article 9 did not confer a right to exemption from disciplinary rules
which applied generally and in a neutral manner, and that there had been no interference with her
right to manifest her religion.65 The Commission also noted that Article 9 protects “only acts and
gestures of individuals which really express the conviction in question.”66
In Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Muslim believers sought to replace the leadership of
their religious organization, thereby causing divisions in the Muslim community.67 Soon
thereafter, the Bulgarian government declared the election of the leader of one of the factions
null and void, removed him from the position, and set up a temporary governing body pending
the election of a new permanent Muslim leader.68 The applicants argued that the religious
community should be allowed to organize according to its own rules, including choosing its own
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leaders.69 The government argued that it had a duty to maintain a climate of “tolerance and
mutual respect” between independent religious institutions, and that the State’s functioning in
this capacity had no bearing on the Muslims’ right to practice their religion.70 The Court noted
that religious communities traditionally exist in organized structures and find meaning in
religious ceremonies and the religious ministers conducting those ceremonies.71 “Participation in
the life of the community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion.”72 The Court also noted that
“but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion...excludes any discretion on the
part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs
are legitimate.”73 The Court held that the interference was not “prescribed by law” in that it was
“arbitrary and was based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the
executive, and did not meet the required standards of clarity and foreseeability.”74
This short list of cases shows the European Court’s commitment to subject a restriction
on religious freedom to exacting scrutiny, particularly with regard to the proportionality test. If a
government is pursuing a legitimate aim, but is doing so by direct proscription of religious
freedom when other means may be available, the law will not stand. Valsamis indicates that the
Court will not defer to religious sensibilities when the law does not explicitly restrict one’s right
to manifest religion, but is instead a generally applicable law that requires what is, in the Court’s
view, rather innocuous participation in a public function. The paper now moves to an analysis of
whether legislation currently on the books in certain States, and ostensibly grounded in the
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“necessity” exceptions of the ICCPR and ECHR, is in fact faithful to the tenets of those
documents and the jurisprudence interpreting them.
IV.

Legislation “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others”
A.

Legislation

Silvio Ferrari says that in the last ten to twenty years a new breed of religiously motivated
terrorists, willing to kill in the name of God, has appeared.75 This reality has occasioned a
pressing need to find a balance between the values of freedom and security, to determine how “to
reconcile religious freedom and national security in a way that makes it possible to
simultaneously enjoy them both.76 More generally, many governments around the world have
adopted measures that are ostensibly “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” from “extremist” religions or religious ideas.
Ferrari identifies three broad types of government intrusion into religious liberty since 9-11: 1)
Government creation of laws restricting a variety of fundamental rights that indirectly affect
religious liberty, e.g. laws making it more difficult to obtain visas, thereby inhibiting missionary
activities; 2) Government scrutinization of religious organizations, including examining the
internal operations of religious organizations to ascertain whether the organization might be a
front for terrorist activity; and 3) Government intrusion into religious beliefs, such as
investigating subversive doctrine that is “tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic
fundamentals of civil society.” 77
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Examples of such restrictive legislation abound. In Russia, the federal law On
Counteracting Extremist Activity78 forbids “the founding and activity of [a] public organisation
whose goals or actions are aimed at carrying out extremist” activities.79 Such prohibited
extremist activities include “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy or inferiority
of citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation.”80
This prohibition is not limited under the law to those acts committed in public, and one
commentator contends that religious groups could face extremism accusations based on private
doctrinal discussions during regular worship services if the group claims exclusive truth based on
the “superiority” of its doctrine.81
Another example is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act enacted in Singapore in
1990.82 For the purpose of protecting religious harmony (and by extension public safety, order,
etc.), the Act gives the State the power to issue a restraining order against any religious
representative who excites “disaffection against the President or the Government while, or under
the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief.”83 Such an order can restrain the
religious representative from addressing a congregation or publishing any text without prior
permission of the state authorities.84
A third example of legislation limiting religious liberty using the limitation language of
the ICCPR and the ECHR is the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and
78
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Religious Organizations. The law lays out numerous guarantees of religious freedom that are
qualified with significant restrictions on that freedom in the name of national security, public
order, life, health, morals and rights and freedoms of others. For example, Article 5 of the law
outlaws “actions aimed at converting believers of one religion into another” and declares
inadmissible “the use of religion for anti-state and anti-constitutional propaganda...and for other
actions against the state, society and individual.85
Finally, since at least 1998 France has actively sought to restrict the development of “new
religious movements.” In 2000 the French National Assembly unanimously approved a law that
created a civil mechanism for the dissolution of religious entities, placed restrictions on the
locations of specified “new religious movements,” prohibited dissemination of information
regarding new religious movements, and criminalized “mental manipulation” or brainwashing.86
The effects of this and other initiatives targeting religious minorities include, among other things,
harassment in the workplace, harassment at school, heightened investigations of religious
organizations financial management systems, imposition of excessive taxes on donations to
religious organizations, and denial of child custody to a parent because of religion.87
B. Legitimate or Illegitimate Restrictions on Religious Freedom?
1.

Facially Invalid?
a.

Overbreadth and Vagueness

The initial question in evaluating the laws laid out in Part IV A. is whether, to borrow
categories from United States Constitutional law, the laws are facially invalid under the ICCPR
85
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or the ECHR. In the United States, a plaintiff may challenge the facial validity of a law
regulating speech under overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, thereby arguing that the law
potentially proscribes speech that is protected under the First Amendment.88 Overbreadth
requires a showing that a law punishes a “‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech, `judged
in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”89 Such a showing serves to invalidate the
entire law “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or
“chill” constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes
criminal sanctions.”90 Overbreadth is rarely found, however, because the U.S. Supreme Court
recognizes that blocking application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially
to constitutionally unprotected conduct, could cause substantial social costs. Thus, the “strong
medicine” of overbreadth invalidation is used sparingly.91
The related doctrine of vagueness allows a challenge to a law that is not a “sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.”92 Sullivan and Gunther point out that the doctrine draws on the procedural due
process requirement of adequate notice, but is also aimed at preventing selective enforcement.93
The Court has said the purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to “prevent arbitrary and
88
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discriminatory enforcement of a law.”94 In further describing unconstitutionally vague laws, the
Court has used phrases such as “unascertainable standard” where essentially “no standard of
conduct is specified at all.”95
b.

“Prescribed by Law”

Though the ICCPR and the ECHR use the phrase “prescribed by law” rather than
overbreadth and vagueness, the terms have analogous aspects. In Kokkinakis, the applicant
argued that the absence of any description of the “objective substance” of the offense of
proselytism “would tend to make it possible for any kind of religious conversation or
communication to be caught by the provision” and that the vague language risked
“extendability” by the police and the courts to permissible exercises of religious freedom.96 The
Court rejected this contention, noting that the wording of many statutes is “not absolutely
precise” and “that many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent,
are vague.”97 The Court further noted that the existence of a body of settled national case law
was sufficient to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct according to the law. Though the
Court rejected the overbreadth and vagueness contention, its discussion indicates the possibility
that a law may be struck down under the ECHR on vagueness grounds.
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, the ECHR said that “prescribed by law” not only
requires that “an impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law, but also refers to the
quality of the law in question, which must be adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is to
say, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual...to regulate his conduct.”98 To
meet these requirements a domestic law “must afford a measure of legal protection against
94
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arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the
Convention...[c]onsequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such
discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise.”99
c.

“Necessary”

Another way to challenge facial validity under the ICCPR or the ECHR would be to
argue that the law in question could never, under any circumstances, be necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others—or to use
the language of the ECHR, the law could never be “necessary in a democratic society.” Thus, it
must be struck down as facially invalid.
d.

Analysis

A facial validity challenge necessarily depends upon the specific wording of the statute in
question. For this reason, the analysis here will assess the facial validity of the several
representative statutes described above. First, none of the statuteswould likely fail as facially
invalid under the ICCPR or ECHR on the ground that the restrictions could never be necessary in
a democratic society, because one could imagine any number of scenarios under which even the
most restrictive language of the statutes might be necessary. For example, Russia’s law on
Counteracting Extremist Activity forbids “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy
or inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion.” One can easily imagine a situation in which
members of one religion might propagate their religious beliefs in such a demeaning or
aggressive way thatothers ’ fundamental rights—to privacy or to their own religious freedom—
are violated. On a broader scale, the tensions that sometimes exist between religions could, based
upon active spreading of disparaging ideas about a competing religion, lead to unrest that
threatens the public order or safety. It would then be necessary for the government to restrict
99
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such “propaganda” and “advocacy.”100 Further, research for this paper did not discover a single
case in which a law was declared facially invalid on this ground.
Second, although vagueness and overbreadth are closer questions, the examples
referenced here would likely survive an overbreadth challenge as well. Though the laws might
apply to religious expression that the government could not in some cases justify restricting, the
“plainly legitimate sweep” of these laws in relation to that possibility would likely protect them
from an overbreadth challenge. The exception to this conclusion would be the Uzbekistan
provision prohibiting “actions aimed at converting believers from one religion to another.” In
Kokkinakis, the Court expressly allowed “appropriate” proselytizing. Thus, a blanket ban on
attempting to convert another, without specifying what would constitute an impropriety, would
fail an overbreadth challenge.
The vagueness question, with which the ECHR has explicitly dealt, raises more
significant problems for the validity of the laws because a religious organization or one of its
members could easily have difficulty determining what activities or teaching of its religion might
count as “exclusionary” or “anti-state.” For example, at this author’s public undergraduate
institution, a debate took place entitled “Can We Be Good Without God?” An atheist argued that
being a moral person and having a theoretical basis for moral opinions does not require belief in
a higher power. A Christian argued that a philosophically sound moral system requires the
existence of a higher power. He went on to argue that among the higher power “options” the God
of Christianity is the most rational explanation for a moral system and for being a moral person.
The talk did not contain any explicit condemnation of other religious viewpoints, nor did it
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attempt to persuade audience members to convert to Christianity. The aim was a religious
explanation for morality, held out as superior to other religious or non-religious explanations.
The question with respect to vagueness (or “prescribed by law”) is whether the law is
“formulated with sufficient precision” to enable citizens to regulate conduct accordingly.101 I
would argue that it is not clear whether the foregoing example of the debate at a public
institution could be prosecuted as extremist under Russia’s law prohibiting “propaganda of
exclusion, advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion,”
because the statute is not clear about these terms. As such, the law does not put the Christian
debater sufficiently on notice that he could be prosecuted. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
criticized Sweden’s Law Against Expression of Disrespect on similar “no objective assessment”
grounds: “This law prohibits the expression of “disrespect” towards favored minority
groups...and lacks any objective standard for identifying disrespect.” 102 A similar lack of
objective standard exists with regard to “exclusion” in the Russia statute, “propaganda” in the
Uzbekistan statute, and “disaffection” in the Singapore statute. Even so, it is not clear that the
ECHR would invalidate any of these measures on vagueness grounds given its care to note that
laws cannot account for every eventuality. Further, because the language in each of the statutes
can be construed as furthering a legitimate aim of government (i.e. proscribing treatment of other
citizens as inferior on the basis of religion), it is likely that they would not be struck down as
facially invalid on vagueness grounds. I predict that the Court would want to adjudicate an “asapplied” claim to determine the necessity of the statute under the particular circumstances, and
whether any conviction under the statute was proportional to the aim pursued.
2.

Invalid “As-Applied”?
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Of course, the nature of an “as-applied” inquiry necessarily depends on the facts of
particular cases. However, considering hypothetical situations to which these laws may be
applied helps in determining their overall fitness. It seems clear that Russia’s prohibition on
“exclusion,” for example, could easily be applied to proscribe the Christian debater’s claim that
Christianity is a superior basis for morality as compared to other religions. I suggest that it is
equally clear that such an application would violate the ICCPR and the ECHR. Insofar as the
speech was an explanation of a religiously motivated belief, the European court would probably
rule as it did in Kokkinakis by saying that expression of religious conviction absent overt
pressure or violence cannot be punished as criminal. Further, prosecution of such a manifestation
of religious belief would likely be scrutinized very closely, in part because it would constitute a
“direct effect” on freedom of religion. As such, it would violate the principle of proportionality
unless the necessity the government puts forth was closely connected to a legitimate aim (and the
more direct the restriction, the more difficult this showing). The debater would have to show that
the views he expressed in the speech were intimately tied to his religious belief, since not every
opinion or preference qualifies as a belief under the instruments.103 But because the speech
involved “some coherent view on fundamental problems”104 and was “obviously related to
religious conviction”105 he would satisfy this requirement. As such, to be justified in prosecuting
the expression of this religious viewpoint, the government would have to show some specific
necessity, under the circumstances, that made the restriction necessary.106
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Beyond this particular hypothetical, the Singapore Maintenance of Religious Harmony
Act’s prohibition of exciting disaffection could easily be applied to restrain religiously motivated
opposition to government policy or practice. Because many religious traditions (not to mention
democratic principles generally) view actively opposing unjust or immoral government action or
cultural tendencies as essential to their mission, this proscription could easily curtail important
religious freedoms. In addition, many traditions actively attempt to persuade individuals and
government of the correctness of their views on a whole host of issues that touch the political
arena. Much of this activity could be viewed under these laws as subversive, and thus
proscribable merely for being in conflict with a government policy or declaration. For example,
if a citizen of the United States opposed the United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence
v. Texas, in which the Court struck down a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy, and
distributed fliers in a community condemning the decision and expressing moral disagreement
with homosexual sodomy, he or she could easily be viewed as spreading “disaffection
against...the Government.” However, such activity is expressly allowable under the ICCPR, and
without some justification beyond the substantive religious disagreement, such as advocacy of
violence or other forms of disruptive dissent, the restriction would violate the instrument.107
Similarly, while France’s NRM law allows dissolution of new religious entities
ostensibly to guard against abuse of the religious freedoms of others, the government’s power of
heightened investigation and dissolution of religious entities because they are “new” is an
illegitimate restriction on religious freedom. In addition, singling out members of NRMs for
individualized restriction simply because of membership in a minority religious group, without
showing a specific “pressing social need” is illegitimate. Such restrictions by extension restrain
the freedom of those who may want to convert to a NRM, thus causing a substantial violation of
107
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a person’s freedom to believe what he or she wants and the freedom to belong to the religion of
one’s choice. The treatment of religious minority groups in France is exactly the type of religious
discrimination that the ICCPR and the ECHR forbid. The language of these laws and others like
them, while possibly not facially invalid, poses serious risks of restricting religious activity for
reasons other than the necessity required under the ICCPR and the ECHR.
V.

The “Principle of Secularism”
A.

Legislation and case law

In addition to laws curtailing religious freedom under the specific necessities of the
ICCPR and the ECHR, some find their justification in the “principle of secularism.” The
principle carries with it the notion that government and society must be protected from religious
overreaching in order to preserve the secular nature of government and the public. For example,
France’s “law on secularism” went into effect on September 2, 2004 and reads as follows: “In
public [primary and secondary schools], the wearing of symbols or clothing through which the
pupils ostensibly manifest a religious appearance is prohibited.”108 Since September, a total of 48
students have been expelled under the law, most of them Muslim girls who refused to remove
their religious headscarves in class.109 In banning the wearing of religious symbols, one French
official said that one purpose of the law was to encourage “mutual respect,” thus implying that
wearing a religious symbol to school is disrespectful to those of other religions.110 Similarly, in
2003 a Swedish pastor was convicted and sentenced to one month imprisonment under a
Swedish law banning disrespectful speech.111 Though the principle of secularism was not
108
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invoked explicitly in the case, the idea of protecting others from offense and disrespect echoes
one of France’s justifications for its
”secularism” laws.
While research for this paper did not identify any HRC cases dealing explicitly with this
issue, the HRC has indirectly considered the question in one case. In Mr. Kenneth Riley, et al. v.
Canada, 112 the Committee found in favor of the Canadian Government, which had allowed a
Sikh member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to wear his turban in place of the traditional
“mountie” Stetson and forage cap that comprised the standard uniform. Two retired RCMP
officers brought the Complaint, arguing that display of such a symbol by national police
constituted a state endorsement of religion by granting “special status” to the Sikh adherent. The
authors claimed that in order to protect their rights under Article 18 of the Covenant, “the State
should remain secular.”113 In rather conclusory fashion, the Committee held that “the authors
have failed to show how the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant has been affected by
allowing a Khals Sikh officer to wear religious symbols.”114 In so holding, the HRC rejected the
idea that a “principle of secularism” required prohibiting a manifestation of religious belief by a
member of a state controlled institution.
In a similar clash, Turkey removed the air force high command’s director of legal affairs
for “having adopted unlawful fundamentalist opinions.”115 The Turkish government argued that
the dismissal constituted a disciplinary sanction for failure to “uphold the secular nature of the
state.”116 In upholding the dismissal, the ECHR said that the compulsory retirement was not an
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interference with freedom of religion or belief, but “was intended to remove from the military
legal service a person who had manifested his lack of loyalty to the foundation of the Turkish
nation, namely secularism, which it was the task of the armed forces to guarantee.”117
Following Kalac, the Court found that discharge of a non-commissioned officer of the
army was not a violation of his rights under Article 9 of the Convention.118 The applicant
contended that his dismissal was based on his religious convictions and the fact that his wife
attempted to get a social security card with a photograph showing her carrying an Islamic
scarf.119 The government asserted as its grounds for dismissal the applicant’s membership in
sects known to have “unlawful fundamentalist tendencies,” his attendance at “ideological”
meetings, and his disciplinary offences while in the army. According to Turkey “any attitude or
conduct such as the applicant’s antisocial character or his wife’s...Islamic scarf had not been
taken as the sole basis for his discharge from the army.”120
In response, the applicant argued that the principle of secularism should guarantee
freedom of religion and conscience rather than operating as a bar to manifestation of religious
belief.121 The ECHR recognized that religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society,
but said that where several religions coexist within one and the same population, “it may be
necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”122 Further, the Court said that pursuing
a military career implies acceptance of the possibility of “placing on certain of the rights and
freedoms of members of the armed forces limitations which could not be imposed on
117
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civilians.”123 The Court said that states may forbid “an attitude inimical to an established order
reflecting the requirements for military service...[and] may include a duty for military personnel
to refrain from participating in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.”124 Finally, the Court
noted with approval that the Supreme Military Council’s dismissal order was not based on
religious beliefs or opinions or performance of religious duties, but rather on “his conduct and
activities in breach of military discipline and the principle of secularism.125
The Court also has developed the principle of secularism in analyzing alleged violations
of Article 11 of the Convention, which delineates the freedom of assembly and association and
uses limitation language similar to Article 9. In a case involving a political party of the Turkish
Parliament, the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the party and banned its leaders from
holding similar office in any other party for five years because the party had become “a centre of
activities contrary to the principles of secularism.”126 In support of the holding, the
Constitutional Court cited numerous speeches given by members of the party advocating violent
overthrow of the government.127 The Turkish Court also noted that “secularism was one of the
indispensable conditions of democracy” and that intervention by the State “to preserve the
secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society.”128
Further, the Court noted that in a secular regime, religion can have no authority over the
constitution and governance of the state. But the Court went further, saying:
Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious matters cannot be
regarded as interference contrary to the requirements of a democratic society...
Secularism, which is also the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the
philosophical essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings simply
123
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cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and legislative provisions. Those are not
matters to which religious requirements and thought apply.”129

The ECHR held in favor of the Turkish government, and in doing so discussed the
relationship between democracy and religion. First, the Court reiterated the necessity of placing
restrictions on religion in order to reconcile the interests of various groups and ensure that
everyone’s beliefs are respected.130 Second, it noted the State’s role as the “neutral and impartial
organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs,” but noted that this duty is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs.”131
Third, the Court said that in a democratic society the State “may limit the freedom to manifest
religion, for example by wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes
with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety,”132
and it may impose on its civil servants the duty to refrain from taking part in the Islamic
fundamentalist movement, “whose goal and plan of action is to bring about the pre-eminence of
religious rules.”133 Finally, the Court said that freedoms guaranteed by Articles 9, 10, and 11 of
the Convention “cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an association, through its
activities, jeopardises the State’s institutions, of the right to protect those institutions.”134
In its Article 10 analysis, the Court noted two other aspects of the protection of individual
rights that round out the picture. First, the Court noted that freedom of expression “is applicable,
subject to paragraph 2, not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or
129
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regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb.”135 As the HRC notes in its General Comment 22, an integral part of religious freedom is
the freedom to express religious views, whether through publication and dissemination of
religious materials or through religious teaching.136 Thus, the spirit of the religious freedom
protections in both the ICCPR and the ECHR include the freedom to espouse religious ideas and
practice religious activity that may be unpopular with majority religions or society at large, again
subject to the necessity limitations in both instruments. As the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
said in a recent Legal Memorandum to the government of Sri Lanka, “Although [religious]
beliefs may be unsettling to some, the freedom to discuss and disseminate such controversial
beliefs—orally or in writing, privately and in public, individually or in community—is firmly
embedded in the freedom to manifest religious belief.”137 Second, in Ozdep v. Turkey, the Court
found that Turkey had violated Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of association) by
dissolving the Freedom and Democracy Party of Turkey. The Court called it “essential” that it
found nothing in the OZDEP’s program “that can be considered a call for violence, an uprising
or any other form of rejection of democratic principles.”138 Further, the Court called it the
“essence of democracy” to allow diverse political projects, “even those that call into question the
way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”139 Thus,
when unpopular ideas don’t explicitly threaten a democratic government or the rights of others,
they are protected under Article 11 of the ECHR.
B.

Analysis
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There are significant problems with the principle of secularism as a ground for restriction
of religious liberty, and with the ECHR’s enforcement of the principle. The first, and most
obvious, is that neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR list defending secularism in principle as a
ground upon which manifestation of religious belief may be restricted. As discussed above, the
necessity clauses are to be construed “strictly” as an exhaustive list of possible justifications.140
Thus, defending the secular nature of the government from religious influence, without a more
specific showing that such influence is actually a threat to the public welfare, is not a sufficient
reason to curtail religious freedom.
Second, the principle of secularism as practiced contradicts the view that robust religious
pluralism is fundamental to democracy.141 To the extent that the principle of secularism functions
as an exclusionary mechanism for public expression of religious views, it is in conflict with the
robust pluralism embraced by both the ECHR and the ICCPR. The pluralism embodied in these
instruments is normative rather than descriptive. That is, it is not merely an observation that
different religions exist, but rather a requirement that governments allow religion to flourish in
society so long as this flourishing does not violate specifically defined limits. Normative
pluralism admits to a government right to restrict religious expression if that expression is truly a
threat to others or to government. Such restrictions may not, however, require a religious
believer to change his or her manifestation of religious belief and practice based simply on
suspicion of religiously informed opinions or specific religious groups, or on keeping democratic
government free from the influence of religious ideas.
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Central to the notion of pluralism is full participation in public life without being required
to leave religious motivations or beliefs in private.142 Thus, the Turkish government’s position in
Refah Partisi that “religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and
legislative provisions” is incompatible with the concept of pluralism as indissociable from
democracy. The ECHR’s endorsement of such a view is in conflict with its explicit endorsement
of religious pluralism and its duty to require specific necessity to curtail religious freedom. To
the extent that Turkey and France, in their application of the principle of secularism, are simply
shielding government and other citizens from the influence of committed religious believers,
they violate the principle of pluralism, and by extension, democracy. Still more, to the extent that
Turkey excludes participation in public government on the basis of certain religious practices or
on the basis of membership in a religious group, or put a different way, conditions participation
in public government on disavowal of such belief or membership, it violates the principle of
pluralism.
In its cases before the ECHR on this subject, Turkey seems to equivocate the notions of
“secularism” and “democracy.” In doing so, the argument goes something like this: protecting
democracy in Turkey essentially requires protecting government from the influence of religion,
because in order to thrive as a democratic country we must keep our government “neutral” (i.e.
secular). Thus, in arguing for the principle of secularism, we are merely arguing for the principle
of democracy. The ECHR seems to endorse this equivocation as within the margin of
appreciation for Turkey by speaking of the democratic “context” in Turkey.143 Turkey is right to
think that human rights are linked to the protection ofdemocratic government in the ICCPR and
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the ECHR.144 However, neither instrument endorses the view that human rights, and particularly
religious freedom, are linked to the protection of secular government, when secular means
protected from the influence of religion.145 So long as protecting democracy (or secularism)
consists of restricting religious expression if it seeks to influence or criticize government (as in
Turkey) or merely seeks to express religious sensibility in public (France’s ban on religious
symbols in public schools), it is not justifiable under the ICCPR or the ECHR.
Indeed, even the expression of a sentiment such as “I would like my religion to hold a
dominant place in government” or “According to the dictates of my religion, it should provide
the rules by which our government operates” without more would not overcome the “pressing
social need” requirement of both the ICCPR and the ECHR. Theoretically, a large religious
group’s expression of such sentiments and intent to act on them could pose a threat to public
order. Without an express threat of “undemocratic” activity, however, a mere possibility that
such sentiment would threaten the public order or the fundamental rights of another would
usually be too attenuated(and thus not pressing enough) under certain ECHR cases to require the
group to dissolve or discontinue dissemination of the views.146 Thus, in Refah Partisi, the Court
should have focused solely on the problematic violent statements of the political party rather than
on a generalized need to protect the secular nature of the state from unpopular and critical views.
Similarly, in Kalac and Baspinar the Court should not have entertained the idea that membership
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in a certain religious group or “failure to uphold” the principle of secularism as such could be
grounds (even if not sole grounds) for dismissal from a government position. This is not to say
that such dismissals could not occur if the nature of the religious expression is truly threatening.
However, the Court’s decisions in deference to the principle of secularism set dangerous
precedent for restriction solely on the basis of membership in a religious group.
Turkey and France might argue that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting
the secular character of government from religious influence because to do otherwise would give
the appearance of an endorsement or establishment of a particular religious view. However, the
ICCPR and the ECHR religion clauses do not forbid establishing a state religion so long as that
establishment does not discriminate against other religions or curtail the religious freedom of
members of the non-state or majority religion. Even assuming a state has a legitimate interest in
avoiding an establishment of religion (and I believe it does), the ECHR “principle of secularism”
cases do not involve the danger of government established religion. Instead, they all involve the
religious manifestations of individuals or groups that express ideas in opposition to the
government or expressive of unpopular religious viewpoints. The motivation of the Turkish
government in each instance has expressly been to insulate government from influence by
religious views. Turkey has put on no evidence that the removal of individuals from positions in
government was necessitated by a need to avoid the appearance of an establishment of religion.
Similarly, there is no evidence that France’s ban on religious symbolswa s motivated by this
concern, and even if it was the ban is on individuals wearing religious symbols rather than the
public school displaying religious symbols. Thus, the religious expression the law curtails would
not be mistaken for government endorsement of any particular religious viewpoint.
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Finally, as noted above, the necessity clauses of both instruments have in view a
“pressing social need” to justify restrictions on religious liberty. Thus, a per se principle of
excluding religious manifestation in public institutions (such as a blanket ban on wearing
religious symbols) cannot possibly be justified under a strict construal of the necessity
doctrine.147 While a situation may arise in which religious tensions in a public school, for
instance, were so high that a temporary ban would be justified to maintain order or to protect
others’ fundamental rights, the proscription would need to be more narrowly tailored than a
blanket ban, the government would have to show the “pressing social need,” and the ban would
have to be proportionate to the need. Such a showing would be burdensome indeed without
something more than the assumption that wearing religious symbols might convey disrespect of
the religious views of another. The French Education Minister’s claim that the law calls for
“mutual respect” assumes that France can show that religious symbols worn by public school
students in France cause others to feel disrespected. It further ignores the fact that a wholly
different intent in wearing religious symbolism is likely the motivation for most wearers of
religious symbols.148 Even if France could show that wearing such symbols caused others to feel
disrespected, to justify the blanket ban France must then show that1) causing another to feel
disrespected by wearing a religious symbol is a violation of a fundamental right to not feel
disrespected (a difficult showing to be sure), or 2) the alleged disrespect caused by the religious
symbols was stirring up the school so as to create a threat to public order, or 3) wearing religious
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symbols violated some well-ensconced moral order in France. Obviously, such a showing would
be nearly impossible.
The ECHR’s acceptance of the principle of secularism as a justification for restricting
religious liberty is not a faithful reading of the ICCPR and the ECHR, and improperly makes
room for illegitimate justifications for those restrictions.
VI.

Ake Green: A case study in the application of “necessity” legislation and the
principle of secularism.
The case of Ake Green in Sweden provides a test case for the fitness of the principles

analyzed above. Green is a pastor in Sweden who was sentenced to one month imprisonment for
preaching and publishing a sermon in which he contended that homosexuality is immoral from a
biblical perspective.149 In the sermon, Green called widespread practice of homosexuality “a
deep cancerous tumor in the entire society” and connected the practice with pedophilia.150 He
called the practice of homosexuality “sexually” twisted and lamented that the country “is facing
a disaster of great proportions.”151 Green’s conviction came under a Swedish law prohibiting the
expression of disrespect towards favored minority groups.152 The conviction and sentence were
overturned by the Swedish appeals court in February 2005, which said that “it is not the role of a
government composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly
teach one religious view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”153 It held that
Green had a right to preach "the Bible's categorical condemnation of homosexual relations as a
sin," even if that position was "alien to most citizens" and even if Green's views could be
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"strongly questioned."154 The government is now petitioning Sweden’s Supreme Court to
reexamine the case,155 and the Becket Fund, a religious liberty organization that filed an amicus
brief in the case, has hinted it will pursue the case to the ECHR or the Human Rights
Commission if need be.156
The Green case starkly raises the question of whether government may restrict clearly
unpopular religious expression. The Becket Fund has argued in the Green case as Amici Curiae
that Green’s religious expression “falls squarely within the protections of Article 18” of the
ICCPR.157 The brief argued that in preaching the sermon, Green was fulfilling his role as a leader
of his congregants to “further their faith by teaching Christian doctrine and applying it to their
lives.”158 With regard to whether proscribing the conduct was necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the brief argued that
Green did not engage in any conduct that put others at risk because he did nothing more than
“proclaim a religious viewpoint.”159 The fact that his viewpoint was controversial and offended
some people “does not remove his religious teaching from Article 18’s protection.”160 Finally,
the brief noted that many religions “make claims of absolute truth in prescribing certain views to
be correct and certain conduct to be either moral or immoral” and such propensity “may
inevitably cause offense.” But Article 18 “provides that it is not the role of a government
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composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly teach one
religious view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”161
Is the Becket Fund’s position correct under the ICCPR and the ECHR, or did this
manifestation of religious belief cross into a realm admitting of restriction? I predict that if the
case makes it to the HRC or the ECHR, the conviction will not be upheld. First, the case does not
involve the type of “influence” on government from a position of civil authority or civil servant
as the Turkey cases do. Thus, the government of Sweden would not be able to defend the
conviction on the ground that it is protecting democratic (or “secular”) principles of government
from undue religious influence. Second, while the sermon used rather offensive language, it did
not advocate harm to homosexuals or threaten public disorder if the laws on homosexuality in
Sweden are not changed. Therefore, Sweden could not defend the conviction on the public order
grounds. The third possibility is to argue that the sermon is a threat to the public moral order
(assuming a majority acceptance of homosexuality). However, disagreeing with a moral order is
not equivalent to threatening a moral order, and more than a showing that the sermon challenges
the public moral order would be required to restrict the law on that ground. This conclusion is
supported by the ECHR position that even opinions that may shock and offend deserve
protection.
Finally, Sweden’s best argument may be the one France makes to defend its secularism
law, namely that the sermon “disrespects” homosexuals and causes offense to them. The facts
show that this has clearly been the result of the sermon; in other words, Sweden is not just
guessing that the view may offend many people. However, disrespect in general does not rise to
the level of a justification for restriction of religious freedom. Had Green gone into a personal
harangue directed towards an individual homosexual using the same language he used in the
161
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sermon, the case would pose a different challenge. Such a personal and specific attack would
quite possibly violate the fundamental rights of another and thus be subject to restriction.
However, the distinction between a personal attack and a sermon denouncing homosexuality
generally is an important one, because the former implicates others’ rights in a way that the latter
does not. In this case, the Becket Fund’s argument that Green should not be restricted in teaching
religious tenets of his faith to his congregation would likely prevail in front of either judicial
body. This is a prediction, but some of the deferential language used by the ECHR in the Turkey
cases could be applied in principle here and cause the case to go the other way. Even so, the
ICCPR and the ECHR documents do not have in mind such expression as a ground for
government restriction of the freedom to manifest religious belief.
VI.

Conclusion

The ICCPR and the ECHR are designed to give significant protection to public
manifestation of religious belief. The laws of certain countries pose threats to this protection
because of their amorphous language and because they leave room for restriction of religious
belief when a “necessity” for the restriction does not in fact exist. The ECHR and the HRC have
generally made the right decisions on this score and have developed principles for curtailing the
more egregious extensions of the language of these laws. I contend that the principle of
secularism, however, is not sufficient, without more, to restrict religious belief, and the ECHR
has used language in its decisions that gives inappropriate deference to government attempts to
defend restrictions on secularism grounds. The case of Ake Green in Sweden may soon give one
of the courts a chance to decide the specific issue of restrictions on unpopular religious doctrine,
and the outcome has the potential to shape future jurisprudence either in the direction of greater
and proper protection of religious liberty or in the direction of greater government restriction of
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religious liberty. Hopefully, either court would strike down Green’s conviction and would take
care to provide a careful analysis to give future guidance in assessing the appropriate balance
between religious liberty and legitimate government restrictions on that liberty.
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